Factors influencing the choice of a safe haven for offloading illegally caught fish: a comparative analysis of developed and developing economies

Table 2 Comparing developed and developing economies

Variables	Developed economies^a n = 20	Developing economies or in transition n = 52	Sig.^b	Effect size (r)	N
Number of visits of IUU fishing vessels^c	5	3	0.366	0.17	72
Concealability
Vessels in port^c	407	52	0.000	0.50	71
% ports within top 125 ports in cargo volume^c	15 % or less	0	0.023	0.23	72
Value fish imports^c	1,390,025	97,636	0.000	0.51	72
Value fish exports^c	1,590,743	121,364	0.000	0.43	72
Convenience
Marine species commercial internationally	15	5	0.011	0.27	71
Quality port infrastructure	5.26	3.89	0.000	0.57	60
Fisheries MCS
Illegal fishing in the country’s waters	5.75	7.31	0.014	0.34	42
Catch inspection schemes	5.53	3.35	0.001	0.51	42
Observer schemes	4.69	2.08	0.000	0.55	42
Vessel monitoring schemes	5.75	3.40	0.003	0.44	42
Control of access to stop illegal fishing	4.56	3.35	0.032	0.29	42
Governance
Political stability	0.68	−0.43	0.000	0.64	72
Government effectiveness	1.34	−0.27	0.000	0.79	72
Control of corruption	1.33	−0.39	0.000	0.76	72
Wildlife protection regulation
# treaties and conventions^c	43	22	0.000	0.61	68
% marine protected areas^c	14.05	2.75	0.000	0.42	70
Environmental sustainability	1.06	0.95	0.000	0.69	62

Italic values indicate significant results
For the purposes of this study, the term “economies” as used by the UN (2009) refers to “countries”
^aMeans are reported for all normally distributed continuous measures. Medians are reported for non-normally distributed continuous and ordinal measures
^bAll non-normally distributed continuous and ordinal measures: Mann–Whitney test (one-tailed; except “Number of visits of IUU fishing vessels”: two-tailed); normally distributed continuous measures: independent-samples T test (one-tailed)
^cNon-normally distributed variable

ISSN: 2193-7680